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Breaking the Bank: Split Interpretations of the
Bank Acts in the Era of #MeToo
Conor R. Harvey†

I.

INTRODUCTION TO THE BANK ACTS

Many conflicts exist between state anti-discrimination laws and
federal banking statutes. Traditionally, federal law provided certain
banks carte blanche to terminate qualifying employees at will, or “at
pleasure.”1 But some federal courts now afford state law protections to
these discharged employees through a more nuanced interpretation of
federal law.2 Today, those courts find that banks do not have an absolute right to fire employees “at pleasure” if the firing violates a state
anti-discrimination law. Consequently, their interpretations conflict
with the interpretations of circuits that hold that federal law provides
certain banks the absolute right to dismiss qualifying personnel “at
pleasure,” subject only to federal law.3
Three different statutes encompass the “Bank Acts”: the National
Bank Act,4 the Federal Reserve Act,5 and the Federal Home Loan Bank
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1
This Comment uses the terms “at will” and “at pleasure” synonymously. See Wiersum v.
U.S. Bank, N.A., 785 F.3d 483, 492 (11th Cir. 2015) (“At pleasure” was utilized by Congress to
mean “only that Bank officers are ‘at will’ employees, as opposed to ‘term’ employees.”).
2
See Fasano v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 457 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2006); Kroske v. U.S. Bank
Corp., 432 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2005); Morris v. U.S. Bank, No. 4:12-cv-281-DPM, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3950 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 10, 2013); Risinger v. HNB Corp., No. 10-2640-KHV/KMH, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 148560 (D. Kan. Dec. 21, 2011); Ewing v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 645
F. Supp. 2d 707 (S.D. Iowa 2009); Crowe v. Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, No. 4:08CV1057 HEA,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3427 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 20, 2009); James v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 471 F.
Supp. 2d 226 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Katsiavelos v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., No. 93 C 7724, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2603 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 1995); Booth v. Old Nat’l Bank, 900 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. W. Va.
1995); Moodie v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 835 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
3
See Wiersum, 785 F.3d 483; Schweikert v. Bank of Am., N.A., 521 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 2008);
Ana Leon T. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., 823 F.2d 928 (6th Cir. 1987).
4
12 U.S.C. §§ 21 et seq. (2012).
5
12 U.S.C. §§ 221 et seq. (2012).
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Act.6 Each of the Bank Acts contains different requirements for governance. For example, to be governed by the National Bank Act, a bank
must include the word “National” in its title and must be certified as a
national banking institution by the comptroller of the currency.7 The
Federal Reserve Act binds all twelve of the United States Federal Reserve Banks.8 And the Federal Home Loan Bank Act governs the eleven
banks supervised by the Federal Housing Finance Agency.9
The Bank Acts all contain similar language within what is known
as their “at-pleasure” provisions,10 and thus, courts often apply jurisprudence regarding one Bank Act’s “at-pleasure” provision interchangeably with the same provision of another Bank Act.11 These provisions
allow a bank’s board of directors governed by one of the Bank Acts to
dismiss certain personnel for whatever reason the board sees fit,12 and
for the most part, without any legal consequence.13 Under the National

6

12 U.S.C. §§ 1421 et seq. (2012).
12 U.S.C. § 35.
8
12 U.S.C. §§ 221–522.
9
12 U.S.C. § 1442a.
10
Compare 12 U.S.C. § 24 (A national banking association “shall have power . . . [t]o elect or
appoint directors, and by its board of directors to appoint a president, vice president, cashier, and
other officers, define their duties, require bonds of them and fix the penalty thereof, dismiss such
officers or any of them at pleasure, and appoint others to fill their places.”) with 12 U.S.C. § 341
(“[A] Federal reserve bank . . . shall have power . . . to appoint by its board of directors a president,
vice presidents, and such officers and employees as are not otherwise provided in this Act, to define
their duties, require bonds for them and fix the penalty thereof, and to dismiss at pleasure such
officers or employees.”).
11
Schweikert v. Bank of Am., N.A., 521 F.3d 285, 288 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he at-pleasure provisions of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act . . . and the Federal Reserve Act . . . have [been] interpreted [ ] consistently with each other and with the at pleasure clause of the [National Bank Act].”);
Stone v. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 92-cv-211, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7927, at *18 (N.D.N.Y. June 6,
1996) (“[T]he ‘dismissal at pleasure’ language is nearly identical in all of these federal bank acts.
Thus, plaintiff cannot avoid [the application of] other cases . . . [because] the employers therein
were not banks organized under the National Bank Act.”); Farmer v. Nat’l City Corp., c-2-94-966,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21478, at *20–21 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 12, 1995) (finding the “at pleasure” language of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, the Federal Reserve Act, and the National Bank Act
are identical).
12
This dismissal power extends to other employees in some contexts. Porter Wright, Nat’l
Bank Act May Preempt Certain Bank Officer Employment Claims, EMPLOYER LAW REPORT (Nov.
12, 2008), https://www.employerlawreport.com/2008/11/articles/eeo/national-bank-act-may-preem
pt-certain-bank-officer-employment-claims/ [https://perma.cc/L2XT-PVKN]; see also Schweikert,
521 F.3d at 290 (“We hold that ratification by a board of directors of a termination is sufficient to
invoke the preemptive effect of the at-pleasure provision of the [National Bank Act].”). Contra
Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court, 811 P.2d 1025, 1032–33, 1036 (Cal. 1991) (“Board action of
many kinds is often ratification of recommendations by senior management. But the board remains responsible for performing its statutory and other functions . . . If [the National Bank Act]
unreasonably requires such a function to be carried out by a bank’s board, the remedy lies with
Congress, not with this court.”).
13
Kemper v. First Nat’l Bank, 418 N.E.2d 819, 821 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (“The provision for
dismissal of officers at the pleasure of the board of directors has been construed consistently to
allow a national bank to discharge an officer without liability.”); see also Mackey v. Pioneer Nat’l
Bank, 867 F.2d 520, 524–25 (9th Cir. 1989); Kozlowsky v. Westminster Nat’l Bank, 6 Cal. App. 3d
7
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Bank Act, these employees include presidents, vice presidents, and
other officers of qualifying banks.14 The Federal Reserve Act extends
dismissal to additional employees.15 Moreover, the Federal Home Loan
Bank Act allows for the “at-pleasure” dismissal of attorneys and
agents.16 Today, in the era of #MeToo, an interesting question is
whether a board’s power to dismiss personnel at will preempts state
laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex or other personal
characteristics.17
This Comment argues that the Bank Acts’ “at-pleasure” provisions
preempt all contradictory state laws.18 However, the Bank Acts should
be amended to allow plaintiffs to bring state law discrimination claims
that parallel—or exactly match—their federal counterparts. Part II of
the Comment explores the origin and purpose of the “at-pleasure” provision. Part III provides a quick overview of anti-discrimination provisions and their applications and interactions with at-will employment.
Part IV discusses the Supremacy Clause and the preemption doctrine
as lenses through which to view this issue. Part V dives into the intersection of state law claims and the supremacy of the Bank Acts. Part VI
discusses solutions to discrimination in the era of #MeToo when federalism preempts state law anti-discrimination provisions.
II. THE ORIGIN OF THE “AT-PLEASURE” PROVISION
The “at-pleasure” provision was first introduced in 1863 as part of
the National Currency Act.19 Congress left “no record of any discussion
of [the ‘at-pleasure’ provision], or of any specific purpose or motive it

593, 596–97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); First Nat’l Bank of Colquitt v. Miller, 98 S.E. 402, 404–05 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1919); Copeland v. Melrose Nat’l Bank, 229 A.D. 311, 313 (N.Y. App. Div. 1930), aff’d, 173
N.E. 898 (N.Y. 1930); Westervelt v. Mohrenstecher, 76 F. 118, 122–23 (8th Cir. 1896).
14
12 U.S.C. § 341.
15
See Little v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 601 F. Supp. 1372, 1375 (N.D. Ohio 1985)
(determining the Federal Reserve Bank could fire a security guard at pleasure under the Federal
Reserve Act); Obradovich v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 569 F. Supp. 785, 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(holding that a painter whose duties did “not seem essential to the Federal Reserve’s discharge of
its financial responsibilities” could be dismissed at pleasure).
16
12 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (2012).
17
See, e.g., Boesch v. Champaign Nat’l Bank, 2008 Ohio 3282 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (finding a
bank officer’s gender discrimination claim brought under state law was preempted by the NBA).
18
Courts interpreting the “at pleasure” language in the Federal Reserve Act and the Federal
Home Loan Act look to the interpretation of the National Bank Act’s nearly identical provision to
identify the preemptive scope of all three federal banking act provisions. See, e.g., Fasano, 457
F.3d at 286–87. This interpretative method is supported by congressional intent. Decades after the
National Bank Act, when enacting the Federal Reserve Act, Congress specified that the purpose
of the “at-pleasure” provision was “precisely analogous to those of the national banks.” H.R. REP.
NO. 63-69 (1913).
19
Act of Feb. 25, 1863 ch. 58, § 11, 12 Stat. 665, 668 (1863).
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might have had in enacting it.”20 Yet as courts21 and commentators22
have noted, historical context suggests that the provision served a
“quite narrow” purpose.23 Its purpose is likely derivative of the National
Currency Act’s purpose, which some have argued Congress passed to:
(1) develop a national currency; (2) create a federal bond market to finance the Civil War; and (3) establish a nationally governed depository
for government funds.24 But the oldest commentator argues that the
National Currency Act, subsequently the National Bank Act once
amended in 1864,25 was passed “to create a market for loans of the general government” and to facilitate the “issu[ance] and circulation of a
currency based upon the credit of the government.”26 Although state
bank notes are obsolete today—long ago replaced by federal currency—
federal banks faced fierce competition from state banks during the second half of the nineteenth century.27 Congress appeared “solicitous of
the new national banks, their competitiveness, and ultimately, the system’s survival,”28 going as far as to enact a ten percent tax on all bank
notes issued by state-chartered banks in an effort to make national
banks competitive.29 The tax proved so successful that it was later considered to have taxed the state banks out of existence.30
Although the congressional record lacks any discussion of the National Bank Act’s “at-pleasure” provision, some courts argue that Congress intended it “to place the fullest responsibility upon the directors

20

Goonan v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 916 F. Supp. 2d 470, 492–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
21
Id.
22
Miriam Jacks Achtenberg, Rereading the Nat’l Bank Act’s ‘At Pleasure’ Provision: Preserving the Civil Rights of Thousands of Bank Employees, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 165, 172 (2008).
23
Goonan, 916 F. Supp. 2d at 493 (interpreting the Federal Reserve Act’s identical language).
24
Achtenberg, supra note 22, at 176; Geoffrey P. Miller, The Future of the Dual Banking Sys.,
53 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 13 (1987); Edward L. Symons, Jr., The “Business of Banking” in Historical
Perspective, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 676, 699 (1983); CHARLES THEODORE BOONE, THE LAW OF
BANKS AND BANKING 290 (1892).
25
Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 8, 13 Stat. 88, 101 (1864) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 21 et seq.)
(“[A] national banking association . . . shall have power . . . to elect or appoint directors, and by its
board of directors to appoint a president, vice president, cashier, and other officers, define their
duties, required bonds of them and fix the penalty thereof, dismiss such officers or any of them at
pleasure, and appoint others to fill their places.”).
26
BOONE, supra note 24, at 290.
27
See Tiffany v. Nat’l Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409, 412 (1873) (describing the National
Bank Act’s pro-competitive policies); M.B.W. Sinclair, Employment at Pleasure: An Idea Whose
Time Has Passed, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 531, 533 (1991).
28
Sinclair, supra note 27, at 533.
29
Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 9, 14 Stat. 93, 146 (1866); see also Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 549 (1869) (upholding the constitutionality of the tax).
30
BOONE, supra note 24, at 290 (quoting Tiffany, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 413) (“Much has accordingly been done to insure their national banks’ taking the place of state banks. The latter, it
is said, ‘have been substantially taxed out of existence.’”).
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[of national banks] by giving them the right to discharge [ ] officers at
pleasure.”31 Specifically, “the power to dismiss bank officers at will reflects the constitutional mandate to establish an independent national
system in order to maintain the stability of, and promote the welfare of,
the national banks.”32 Furthermore, it empowers banks to immediately
remove questionable individuals on the basis that a strong public image
is important to a bank’s prosperity.33 Although simple,34 this argument
is nevertheless valid. Because banks profit by caring for their customers’ money, untrusting customers will withdraw that money, and the
banks’ prosperity will leave with it.35 While national banks no longer
need a competitive advantage over state banks, customers simply will
not deposit money in institutions they do not trust. Whether that trust
is lost by a bank officer’s actual misbehavior, mismanagement, or by
some fiction, the same result occurs: less money is deposited and less
prosperity is achieved. Federal deposit insurance may mitigate the effects of untrusting customers; however, it likely cannot eliminate their
fears altogether.36
Their effectiveness aside, the “at-pleasure” provisions remain
largely untouched since their enactments and continue to serve their
alleged purpose.37 Yet, lacking other evidence and left with this broad
purpose, some courts interpret the provisions according to their more
tailored views. Until relatively recently, courts truly and consistently
upheld a bank’s right to discharge its officers “at pleasure.” But in the

31

Copeland v. Melrose Nat’l Bank, 229 A.D. 311, 313 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1930), aff’d, 173 N.E. 898
(N.Y. 1930). But see Note, Statutory Provision for Removal of Corporate Officer “At Pleasure”, 50
HARV. L. REV. 518, 520 (1937) (characterizing Westervelt v. Mohrenstecher, 76 F. 118 (8th Cir.
1896), similar interpretation of the purpose of the “at-pleasure” provision as “conjecture”).
32
Alegria v. Idaho First Nat’l Bank, 723 P.2d 858, 860 (Idaho 1986) (citing Westervelt, 76 F.
at 122).
33
See Westervelt, 76 F. at 122 (“Observation and experience alike teach that it is essential to
the safety and prosperity of banking institutions that the active officers, to whose integrity and
discretion the moneys and property of the bank and its customers are instructed, should be subject
to immediate removal whenever the suspicion of faithlessness or negligence attaches to them. High
credit is indispensable to the success and prosperity of a bank.”); Mackey v. Pioneer Nat’l Bank,
867 F.2d 520, 526 (9th Cir. 1989) (The purpose of the provision is to give national banks “the
greatest latitude possible to hire and fire their chief operating officers, in order to maintain the
public trust.”).
34
Sinclair, supra note 27, at 534.
35
Id.
36
For example, because federal deposit insurance insures up to $250,000, adjusted for inflation, a person with funds exceeding $250,000 may choose to place that money elsewhere. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821 (2012). Moreover, 27 percent of millennials think Bitcoin is more trustworthy than incumbent banks, such as JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, and Goldman Sachs. Blockchain Capital,
Bitcoin Survey Fall 2017, http://www.survey.blockchain.capital/#1509374164943-0459e9
29-976e [https://perma.cc/V2F2-MQWX].
37
See Westervelt, 76 F. at 122 (“to provide for [the lack of public confidence in a bank officer]”).
Remember, courts interpret the Bank Acts’ “at-pleasure” provisions analogously. See Fasano v.
Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 457 F.3d 274, 286–87 (3d Cir. 2006).
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era of #MeToo and other anti-discriminatory movements, courts might
view the “at-pleasure” provisions from a different perspective.
III. EMPLOYMENT “AT PLEASURE” AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
PROVISIONS
Traditionally, at-will,38 or “at-pleasure,”39 employment barred a
“claim of entitlement to continued employment enforceable against the
employers.”40 However, the Supreme Court has upheld some restrictions on these employment relationships.41 Various state laws have
forbidden employment discrimination since the 1940s, and similar federal statutes have done so since the 1960s.42 Today, federal statutory
restrictions prohibit discrimination on the basis of age,43 physical disability,44 “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,”45 wage garnishment,46 “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,”47 military status,48 jury duty,49 and a myriad of other classifications50 that
limit an employer’s ability to fire an employee at will. Many of these
federal anti-discrimination statutes contain express anti-preemption
provisions that preserve parallel state laws and remedies.51 Yet no such
provision exists in any of the three Bank Acts. Consequently, courts often struggle to properly apply the Bank Acts’ “at-pleasure” provisions.
While “[a]ll courts recognize that, to the extent that the federal banking

38

Black’s Law Dictionary, (11th ed. 2019), available at Westlaw BLACKS (“Employment that
is usu. undertaken without a contract and that may be terminated at any time, by either the employer or the employee, without cause.”).
39
“That Congress used the term ‘at pleasure’ instead of ‘at will’ in the National Bank Act is
not surprising. The term ‘at will’ would not be employed for more than a decade after Congress
passed the National Bank Act.” Achtenberg, supra note 22, at 172.
40
Cherin v. Lyng, 874 F.2d 501, 504 (8th Cir. 1989).
41
See generally NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding a federal
restriction on employment at will that sought to balance the relationship between employers and
employees).
42
See, e.g., Act of Mar. 12, 1945, ch. 118, 1945 N.Y. Laws 457; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-353, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
43
29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (2012).
44
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (2012); 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (2012).
45
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (2012).
46
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (2012).
47
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
48
38 U.S.C. § 4311 (2012).
49
28 U.S.C. § 1975 (2012).
50
42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2012) (protecting employees under the Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. § 3608
(2012) (providing employee protection in asbestos actions); 42 U.S.C. § 1997d (2012) (providing
protection to employees reporting the mistreatment of an institutionalized person).
51
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7.
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acts conflict with subsequently enacted anti-discrimination laws, subsequent federal anti-discrimination law must prevail,”52 courts often
split with one another when attempting to simultaneously apply the
“at-pleasure” provisions and state anti-discrimination statutes.
IV. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
National State Bank v. Long53 explains that “whatever may be the
history of federal-state relations in other fields, regulation of banking
has been one of dual control since the passage of the National Bank Act
in 1863.”54 Still, since as early as 1819, the Supreme Court has maintained that nationally chartered banks are federal instrumentalities
entitled to regulate themselves without state interference.55 State laws
only apply to a bank governed by the Bank Acts insofar as the laws do
not “infringe the national banking laws or impose an undue burden on
the performance of the bank’s functions.”56 Therefore, otherwise valid
state law discrimination claims must be dismissed if they conflict with
the Bank Acts’ “at-pleasure” provisions. Nevertheless, because courts
exercise substantial discretion in determining whether a state and federal law conflict, and consequently, whether a federal law preempts a
state law, some state law discrimination claims proceed despite being
barred by the “at-pleasure” provisions.
Federal preemption, read from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,57 requires reviewing courts to examine congressional intent58
and the “purpose of the disputed federal statute.”59 Preemption exists
in three different forms: (1) express preemption; (2) field preemption;
and (3) conflict preemption.60 First, express preemption occurs when
Congress explicitly defines the “extent to which its enactments preempt state law.”61 An explicit congressional preemption of state laws

52

Achtenberg, supra note 22, at 167 (emphasis in original).
630 F.2d 981 (3d Cir. 1980).
54
Id. at 985.
55
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 327 (1819).
56
Anderson Nat’l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 248 (1944); see also Barnett Bank, N.A. v.
Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996) (“Congress would not want States to forbid, or to impair significantly, the exercise of a power that Congress explicitly granted. To say this is not to deprive States
of the power to regulate national banks, where (unlike here) doing so does not prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank’s exercise of power.”); Aalgaard v. Merch. Nat’l Bank, Inc.,
224 Cal. App. 3d 674, 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
57
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. (“[T]he Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law
of the Land.”).
58
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78 (1990); Aalgaard, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 686.
59
Goonan v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 916 F. Supp. 2d 470, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
60
Peatros v. Bank of Am. NT & SA, 990 P.2d 539, 542–43 (Cal. 2000).
61
Id.
53
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that regulate banks is a rare occurrence.62 The “at-pleasure” provisions
do not expressly preempt state anti-discrimination laws and courts are
generally left to determine the proper boundaries and application of federal and state laws.63
Second, field preemption occurs when a state law “regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively.”64 Congressional “intent may be inferred from a
‘scheme of federal regulation . . . so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,’ or
where an Act of Congress ‘touches a field in which the federal interest
is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.’”65 In 1869, the Supreme
Court noted that national banks were “subject to the laws of the State
and are governed in their daily course of business far more than the
laws of the State than of the Nation.”66 Since then, it has generally been
accepted that the Bank Acts do not employ field preemption.67 Consequently, courts recognize the “historic dual regulation of banks by state
and federal law.”68
Third, conflict preemption occurs when a state law “actually conflicts” with a federal law.69 The Supreme Court recognizes that “‘federal
62

See Nat’l State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 985 (3d Cir. 1980) (“In only a few instances has
Congress explicitly preempted state regulations of national banks. More commonly, it has been
left to the courts to delineate the proper boundaries of federal and state supervision.”).
63
See id.; Goonan, 916 F. Supp. 2d 470, 491 (2013) (“The [Federal Reserve Act] contains no
such express preemption clause and does not, by its plain language terms, speak to state-antidiscrimination laws.”); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 868 (2000); see also, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 594–95 (2011).
64
Peatros, 990 P.2d at 542; see also Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25,
31 (1996); English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78 (1990).
65
English, 496 U.S. at 79 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
66
First Nat’l Bank of Louisville v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. 353, 362 (1869).
67
Katsiavelos v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., No. 93 C 7724, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2603, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 1995) (“[A] state may attempt to affect the conduct of [national] bank officials so
long as the exercise of their authority does not conflict with, or frustrate the purposes of federal
law or impair the efficiency of banks to perform their statutory duties.”); see also Wells Fargo Bank
N.A. v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949, 963 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Since shortly after the Bank Act was enacted
in 1864, the Supreme Court has oft reiterated that federal substantive authority over national
banks is not exclusive.”).
68
Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Nat’l State Bank v.
Long, 630 F.2d 981, 985 (3d Cir. 1980) (“Whatever may be the history of federal-state relations in
other fields, regulation of banking has been one of dual control since the passage of the first National Bank Act.”); Idaho v. Sec. Pac. Bank, 800 F. Supp. 922, 925 (D. Idaho 1992) (“It is clear that
Congress has not completely preempted the entire banking field.”).
69
Peatros, 990 P.2d at 542–43; see also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 109 (2000) (Conflict preemption “occurs when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or when
the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objective of Congress.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505
U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (“In the absence of an express congressional command, state law is pre-empted
if that law actually conflicts with federal law[.]”).
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law may be in irreconcilable conflict with state law,’ such that ‘[c]ompliance with both statutes’ results in a ‘physical impossibility,’ and
caus[es] the state law to stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”70 The
Bank Acts neither employ express preemption nor exclusively occupy
the field of banking regulation; consequently, conflict preemption must
apply, voiding state laws “if they conflict with federal law, frustrate the
purposes of[,] . . . or impair the efficiency of national banks to discharge
their duties.”71
V.

THE INTERSECTION OF STATE LAW CLAIMS AND THE SUPREMACY
OF THE BANK ACTS

Plaintiffs alleging employment discrimination often pursue claims
under both state and federal law. Federal circuit courts—as well as
many federal district courts—are split concerning whether the Bank
Acts preempt state anti-discrimination laws.72 While similarities often
exist between federal and state anti-discrimination laws, the laws are
not always identical. These differences often result in drastically different outcomes for plaintiffs depending on the location where a cause of
action arises. Consequently, if a uniform preemption application is to
be applied, the Supreme Court will need to clarify the extent to which
the “at-pleasure” provisions preempt contradictory state laws.
If the “at-pleasure” provisions are read according to their plain
text,73 then it follows that the Bank Acts preempt all state law discrimination claims. Despite this, not all courts adopt such a textualist

70

Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 785 F.3d 483, 491 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Barnett Bank,
N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996)); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S.
141, 153 (1982).
71
Bank of Am. v. San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 561 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Barnett Bank, 517
U.S. at 33–37 (holding that a federal statute granting national banks authority to sell insurance
conflicts with, and therefore preempts, state laws forbidding national banks from selling insurance); Franklin Nat’l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 377–79 (1954) (determining that the power
of national banks to receive deposits conflicts with, and therefore preempts, a state statue prohibiting the use of the word “savings” in banking advertisements); Anderson Nat’l Bank v. Luckett,
321 U.S. 233, 248–49 (1944) (holding that a state law allowing the transfer of abandoned bank
deposits was not preempted because “national banks are subject to state laws, unless those laws
infringe the national banking laws or impose an undue burden on them”).
72
See, e.g., Morris v. U.S. Bank, No. 4:12-cv-281-DPM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3950 (E.D. Ark.
Jan. 10, 2013); Risinger v. HNB Corp., No. 10-2640-KHV/KMH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148560 (D.
Kan. Dec. 21, 2011); Ewing v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 645 F. Supp. 2d 707 (S.D. Iowa
2009); Crowe v. Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, No. 4:08CV1057 HEA, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3427
(E.D. Mo. Jan. 20, 2009); James v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 471 F. Supp. 2d 226 (E.D.N.Y. 2007);
Katsiavelos v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., No. 93 C 7724, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2603 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 3, 1995); Booth v. Old Nat’l Bank, 900 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. W. Va. 1995); Moodie v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 835 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
73
See Kemper v. First Nat’l Bank in Newton, 418 N.E.2d 819, 171–72 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)
(“[T]he words “dismiss * * * at pleasure” should be taken to signify exactly that, as courts in many
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view.74 The circuits take one of three approaches: (1) total preemption;
(2) retail preemption; and (3) wholesale preemption.75 The Fourth,
Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits follow the total preemption approach.76
Total preemption requires that the “at-pleasure” provisions preempt
contradictory state laws without question, even if the state statutes are
consistent with federal law.77 The Ninth Circuit follows the retail
preemption approach.78 Retail preemption requires that a federal law
preempt a state law only to “the minimum extent necessary,” as long as
the state law “substantively mirrors” the federal law.79 Finally, the
Third Circuit follows the wholesale preemption approach.80 Wholesale
preemption requires that federal laws preempt state laws that do not
“exactly match” their federal counterparts; that is, the discrimination
causes of actions and remedies under state law must be exactly the
same as those allowed for under federal law.81
Moreover, numerous federal district courts in circuits that have not
addressed the preemption issues of the Bank Acts fall within those categories. It is important to note these district court rulings because those
rulings may indicate which preemption theory a circuit court will employ. For example, in Fasano v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York,82
the Third Circuit “count[ed] [itself] fortunate to have the benefit of a
very well-reasoned opinion of Judge Padova of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania”83 from Evans v. Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.84

jurisdictions have said for over a century.”).
74
See generally Kroske, 432 F.3d 976; Morris, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3950; Ewing, 645 F.
Supp. 2d 707; James, 471 F. Supp. 2d 226; Lambright v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of S.F., No.
C074340CW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91075 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2007); Moodie, 835 F. Supp. 751.
75
Another approach, proposed by three dissenting justices of the Supreme Court of California,
strongly suggests that later-enacted federal anti-discrimination regulations do not impliedly
amend the Federal Reserve Act. This would immunize the Federal Reserve Banks from any liability under Title VII, the American with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, and other federal anti-discrimination statutes. No federal courts have adopted this approach.
See Peatros, 990 P.2d 539, 183–89 (Brown, J., dissenting).
76
See Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 785 F.3d 483 (11th Cir. 2015); Schweikert v. Bank of Am.,
N.A., 521 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 2008); Ana Leon T. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., 823 F.2d 928 (6th
Cir. 1987).
77
See Fasano v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 457 F.3d 274, 286 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[T]otal preemption holdings suggest that any state-created limitation on the bank’s power would fundamentally,
and irreconcilably, conflict with Congress’s intent to grant total, unlimited discretion.”) (emphasis
in original).
78
See Kroske, 432 F.3d 976 (2005).
79
Id. at 986–87.
80
See Fasano v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 457 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2006).
81
Id. at 274.
82
457 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2006).
83
Id. at 287.
84
No. 03-4975, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13265 (E.D. Pa. July 8, 2004).
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Thus, district court decisions occasionally predict how an undecided circuit might resolve preemption or provide a roadmap for a circuit court
that has not considered the issue.
A.

Total Preemption (Followed by the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh
Circuits)

The Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that the
Bank Acts’ “at-pleasure” provisions completely forbid state law prohibitions that limit a qualifying bank’s ability to discharge certain personnel. In Ana Leon T. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,85 one of the
older cases concerning the Bank Acts’ preemption of state law, the Sixth
Circuit determined that the Federal Reserve Act’s “at-pleasure” provision preempted state law discrimination claims.86 Plaintiff Ana Leon T.,
a woman of Colombian origin and former employee of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, filed an action under both Title VII and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Act87 for wrongful discharge based on her national
origin.88 With little analysis, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the Federal Reserve Act’s “at-pleasure” provision prevented a bank employee
from stating a claim under Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Act, a statute prohibiting employers from discriminating against employees on the basis
of national origin.89 Despite its lack of analysis, the Sixth Circuit ruled
broadly: the Federal Reserve Act’s “at-pleasure” provision “preempts
any state-created employment right to the contrary.”90
The Ana Leon T. ruling was not met without criticism. For instance, in Katsiavelos v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,91 the Northern District of Illinois criticized “[t]he Leon court [for] provid[ing] no
reasons or policy for its holding.”92 The Southern District of New York
refused to follow the decision because “the Sixth Circuit’s pronouncement [in Ana Leon T.] gives no basis for its opinion and sets forth no
policy reasons for its holding.”93 Moreover, in White v. Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland,94 the Ohio Court of Appeals stated that “[t]he Sixth

85

823 F.2d 928 (6th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 931.
87
MICH. COMP LAWS ANN. § 37.2202(1)(a) (2018).
88
See generally, Ana Leon T., 823 F.2d at 928.
89
MICH. COMP LAWS ANN. § 37.2202(1)(a); Ana Leon T., 823 F.2d at 929–31.
90
Ana Leon T., 823 F.2d at 931 (emphasis added); accord Kispert v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of
Cincinnati, 778 F. Supp. 950, 952–53 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (determining the Federal Home Loan Bank
Act’s “at-pleasure” provision preempted a state claw claim for age discrimination).
91
No. 93 C 7724, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2603 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 1995).
92
Id. at *6.
93
Moodie v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 831 F. Supp. 333, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
94
660 N.E.2d 493 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
86
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Circuit . . . failed to engage in any analysis or state the basis of its decision.” Thus, the Ohio court “decline[d] to rely upon the holding in Ana
Leon T.”95 Despite these criticisms and the passage of nearly twenty
years, the Sixth Circuit has since reiterated its holding in Ana Leon T.
that the “at-pleasure” provision preempts all state law employment discrimination claims.96 Similarly, before Ana Leon T., in Wiskotoni v.
Michigan National Bank-West,97 the Sixth Circuit observed that the
National Bank Act’s “at-pleasure” provision “has consistently been construed by both federal and state courts as preempting state law governing employment relations between a national bank and its officers and
depriving a national bank of the power to employ its officers other than
at pleasure.”98
Likewise, in Schweikert v. Bank of America, N.A.,99 the Fourth Circuit determined that the National Bank Act’s “at-pleasure” provision
preempted the state law claims before the court.100 Plaintiff Schweikert,
a bank officer, was terminated by his former employer’s board of directors for failing to cooperate with both internal and external investigations of the bank.101 Schweikert sued the Bank of America, alleging
wrongful or abusive discharge.102 Relying on the National Bank Act’s
“at-pleasure” provision, the district court dismissed Schweikert’s action
and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.103 In its decision, the Fourth Circuit
noted that it previously interpreted the analogous “at-pleasure” provision of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act in a wrongful discharge action
based on state law.104 This precedent—Andrews v. Federal Home Loan
Bank of Atlanta105—concluded that “Congress intended for federal law
to define the discretion which the Bank may exercise in the discharge
of employees.”106 Any wrongful termination claim under state law

95

Id. at 495.
See Arrow v. Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 358 F.3d 392, 393 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[I]nasmuch
as Arrow was an employee of a Federal Reserve Bank, her rights under Kentucky state law were
preempted by federal law.”).
97
716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983).
98
Id. at 387; accord Arrow, 358 F.3d at 394.
99
521 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 2008).
100
Id. at 288–89; see also Citizens Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Stockwell, 675 So. 2d 584, 586
(Fla. 1996) (Prior to the Fourth Circuit’s ruling, the Supreme Court of Florida found that the “atpleasure” provision precludes any “limitation on the power of a bank to remove its officers” under
the National Bank Act).
101
Schweikert, 521 F.3d at 287.
102
Id.
103
See generally id.
104
Id. at 288 (citing Andrews v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Atl., 998 F.2d 214, 220 (4th Cir.
1993)).
105
998 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1993).
106
Id. at 220.
96
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“would plainly conflict with the discretion accorded the Bank by Congress.”107 Consequently, and consistent with Andrews,108 the Fourth
Circuit held that “the at-pleasure provision of the National Bank Act
preempts state law claims for wrongful discharge.”109
Finally, in Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A.,110 a succinct opinion citing
Wiskotoni,111 the Eleventh Circuit joined the Sixth and Fourth Circuits.112 Plaintiff Wiersum alleged wrongful termination by U.S. Bank,
N.A. under the Florida Whistleblower Act113 for his discharge after he
objected to certain activities that he believed were unlawful and refused
to participate in them.114 After noting that several circuits, as well as
the Supreme Court of Florida, had found conflict preemption between
similar state laws and the Bank Acts, the Eleventh Circuit followed suit
in finding preemption without providing much reasoning of its own.115
Together, the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits constitute the
three circuits that provide for the Bank Acts’ total preemption of state
law. The total preemption approach is alive and well, and its position
as the approach followed by the most circuits suggests it might be
adopted by other courts in the future that have yet to rule upon the
proper application of the “at-pleasure” provisions.
B.

Retail Preemption (Followed by the Ninth Circuit)

In Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp.,116 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the National Bank Act’s “at-pleasure” provision preempts state
law, ultimately rejecting the Sixth Circuit’s “summary conclusion” in
Ana Leon T.117 Plaintiff Kroske, a bank officer, alleged that the bank
terminated her in violation of the Washington Law Against Discrimination, a state law prohibiting age discrimination in employment.118
Although Kroske did not pursue a claim under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act,119 or any federal claim at all,120 the court concluded

107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120

Id.
998 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1993).
Schweikert, 521 F.3d at 288–89.
785 F.3d 483 (11th Cir. 2015).
716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983).
Wiersum, 785 F.3d at 491.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.102(3) (2018).
Wiersum, 785 F.3d at 486.
Id. at 489–91.
432 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 980–89.
Id. at 978; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.010 et seq. (2018).
29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (2012).
The court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012); Kroske, 432 F.3d at 979.
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that the National Bank Act did not preempt her claim.121 Instead, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act impliedly amended the National Bank Act’s “at-pleasure” provision to “the minimum extent necessary” to resolve contradictory federal laws.122 Furthermore, the court
reasoned that because Kroske’s state law claim under the Washington
Law Against Discrimination “substantively mirrored” a federal claim
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the National Bank
Act did not preempt her state claim.123 Although the Ninth Circuit
failed to define its “substantively mirrors” standard, it explained that
“state law provisions prohibit[ing] termination on grounds more expansive than the grounds set forth in federal law” remain preempted.124
While district courts in the Second Circuit have reached conflicting
decisions as to whether the Bank Acts’ “at-pleasure” provisions preempt
state anti-discrimination law, they have more recently followed the retail preemption approach. For example, in James v. Federal Reserve
Bank of New York,125 the Eastern District of New York adopted the Supreme Court of California’s retail preemption approach, concluding that
federal law preempts state law to the extent that the laws conflict, but
that federal law does not preempt state law to the extent that the laws
do not conflict.126 And as of yet, the Southern District of New York
seems to agree. In Moodie v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York,127 the
court held that the Federal Reserve Act’s “at-pleasure” provision did not
preempt the New York State Human Rights Law because “Congress did
not intend the Federal Reserve Act to preempt state anti-discrimination

121

Kroske, 432 F.3d at 987, 988 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 102 (1983)
(noting that its “conclusion is buttressed by the ‘importance of state fair employment laws to the
federal enforcing scheme’” and that “parallel state anti-discrimination laws are explicitly made
part of the enforcement scheme of federal laws”)).
122
Id. at 986.
123
Id. at 987; see also Anderson v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 336 F.3d 924, 926 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating the Washington Law Against Discrimination “tracks federal law”); Grimwood v. Univ. of Puget
Sound, Inc., 753 P.2d 517, 520 (Wash. 1988) (holding that because the Washington Law Against
Discrimination “does not provide any criteria for establishing an age discrimination case,” Washington courts look to federal cases construing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
124
Kroske, 432 F.3d at 989. Beyond the “substantively mirrors” standard, at least one federal
district court in a circuit yet to rule on this issue, without citing any other court’s opinion on this
issue, determined that the “at-pleasure” provision of the National Banking Act does not preempt
a retaliatory discharge claim because public policy favors allowing such a claim. See Ruisinger v.
HNB Corp., No. 10-2640-KHV/KMH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148560, at *13 (D. Kan. Dec. 21, 2011)
(citing Sargent v. Cent. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Enid, 809 P.2d 1298, 1301–02 (Okla. 1991)).
125
471 F. Supp. 2d 226, 236 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
126
James, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 236; see also Peatros v. Bank of Am., 990 P.2d 539, 553 (Cal.
2000) (“In a preemption case . . . state law is displaced only to the extent that it actually conflicts
with federal law. This rule [is] that a federal court should not extend its invalidation of a statute
further than necessary to dispose of the case before it.” (citing Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning Servs., 516 U.S. 474, 476 (1995) (per curiam)).
127
835 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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laws that are consistent with federal anti-discrimination legislation.”128
Moreover, the court found that Title VII made no mention of exempting
qualifying bank personnel from the act’s requirements.129 Consequently, the court reasoned that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
is subject to New York anti-discrimination laws to the extent that those
laws are analogous to federal law.130 The Southern District of New
York’s decision in Moodie backtracks on Osei-Bonsu v. Federal Home
Loan Bank of New York,131 an earlier decision from the same district.
There, the court held that a New York state human rights agency could
not pursue a state claim against a national bank because the Federal
Home Loan Bank Act’s “at-pleasure” provision preempted the cause of
action.132
Similarly, the Northern District of California determined that the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corporation133 allows
courts to “limit relief for [a] Plaintiff’s [state law discrimination] claims
against Defendant [Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco] to that
which is available under Title VII.”134 When adopting this approach, the
Southern District of Iowa described it as the “most consistent with the
law of conflict preemption.”135 And the Eastern District of Arkansas,
following Ewing v. Federal Home Loan Bank of Des Moines,136 noted
that “[t]he relevant inquiry is the variance” between the federal and
state anti-discrimination laws at issue, “and whether [the state law]
conflicts with [the federal law] such that all or part of [the state law] is
preempted.”137 To the Eastern District of Arkansas, such a conflict must
make a legal difference in the case,”138 which did not include “differing
statutes of limitation, exhaustion requirements, punitive damages
caps, and permissible liability against supervisors under Arkansas law
[but not federal law].”139 Despite such differences, the Eastern District

128

Moodie, 835 F. Supp. at 753.
Id.
130
Id.
131
726 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
132
Id. at 98.
133
432 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2005).
134
Lambright v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of S.F., No. C074340CW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91075,
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2007).
135
Ewing v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 645 F. Supp. 2d 707, 720 (S.D. Iowa 2009).
136
645 F. Supp. 2d 707 (S.D. Iowa 2009).
137
Morris v. U.S. Bank, No. 4:12-cv-281-DPM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3950, at *5 (E.D. Ark.
Jan. 10, 2013).
138
Id.
139
Id. at *6.
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of Arkansas characterized the state anti-discrimination law as a
“mere[] echo[] of Title VII.”140
In Katsiavelos v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,141 the Northern
District of Illinois held that the bank was subject to the Illinois Human
Rights Act,142 a statute containing anti-discrimination provisions modeled after federal anti-discrimination law.143 The district court disagreed with the Sixth Circuit’s Ana Leon T. ruling, finding that the Federal Reserve Act’s “at-pleasure” provision preempts only contractual
rights and not other, non-contractual federal or state rights in employment.144 In fact, the Northern District of Illinois criticized the Sixth Circuit’s Ana Leon T. decision, claiming that the ruling “provided no reasons or policy for its holding that all state employment rights were preempted by the dismiss at pleasure language.”145 In doing so, the Northern District of Illinois determined that “dismiss at pleasure is analogous
to dismiss at will, implying the absence of a contractual relationship
between employer and employee. The right to be free from discrimination is not a contractual right, and therefore is not necessarily embodied
in the dismiss at pleasure language.”146
C.

Wholesale Preemption (Followed by the Third Circuit)

In Fasano v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York,147 the Third Circuit
reasoned that the Federal Reserve Act’s “at-pleasure” provision entirely148 preempts state laws that fail to “exactly match” their federal
counterparts.149 Plaintiff Fasano, pursuing claims under New Jersey

140

Id. at *7.
No. 93 C 7724, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2603 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 1995).
142
775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-101 (LEXIS 2018).
143
Katsiavelos v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., No. 93 C 7724, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2603, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 1995).
144
Id. at *2; accord White v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 660 N.E.2d 493, 495 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1995) (agreeing with Katsiavelos and holding that plaintiff’s state law claim of handicapped
discrimination was not preempted by the Federal Reserve Act).
145
Katsiavelos, No. 93 C 7724, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2603, at *2.
146
Id. Contra Mele v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 359 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2004) (“We hold
that the Federal Reserve Act precludes enforcement against a federal reserve bank of an employment contract that would compromise its statutory power to dismiss at pleasure, and prevents the
development of a reasonable expectation of continued employment.”).
147
457 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2006).
148
Compare id. at 290 (“There is simply no way to give full effect to [ ] state laws while picking
and choosing which parts of them may apply.”) with Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.2d at 987–
88, 989 (holding that only actual inconsistencies in state laws are preempted rather than entire
provisions).
149
Fasano, 457 F.3d at 290; cf. Mele, 359 F.3d at 255 (previously holding the “at-pleasure”
provision of the Federal Reserve Act bars all contractual employment claims against a Federal
Reserve Bank; however, leaving unresolved whether preemption extends to statutory employment
claims).
141
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law, alleged she was fired by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in
retaliation for complaining about illegal activity and that the bank
failed to accommodate her disability.150 As it “wad[ed] into murky waters,” the Third Circuit explicitly rejected both the Sixth Circuit’s Ana
Leon T.151 approach and the substantive-mirror approach adopted by
the Ninth Circuit in Kroske.152 Developing its own, self-described “partial preemption” approach, the Third Circuit requires that, to avoid
preemption, state laws must “exactly match” their federal counterparts
because the court will not “pare back” state law to match federal law.153
Ultimately, despite the fact that federal law and New Jersey law both
covered Fasano’s causes of action, because the courts had not identically
interpreted the remedies of Fasano’s state claims, her claims were
preempted in their entirety.154
Similarly, in Crowe v. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,155 the
Eastern District of Missouri adopted the Third Circuit’s approach, determining that “broad state employment laws cannot apply to the Federal Reserve Banks when those state laws prohibit those acts that are
incident to Federal Reserve Banks dismissing ‘at pleasure’ their employees, within the bounds of the [Americans with Disabilities Act.]”156
In doing so, the court dismissed a plaintiff’s claim that would have allowed him to seek additional remedies under state law beyond those
allowed for under federal law.157
VI. FEDERALISM IN THE ERA OF #METOO
A “wide split in authority” exists158 and continues to grow with little
evidence that the Supreme Court will enter the fray.159 At one extreme,
the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that personnel dismissed

150

These claims respectively fall under the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Act, N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-1 et seq. (2018), and New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 10:5-1 et seq. (2018). Federal law prohibits retaliation against bank employees complaining of
illegal conduct. 12 U.S.C. § 1831(j) (2012). It also prohibits employers from discrimination on the
basis of disability. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (2012).
151
823 F.2d 928 (6th Cir. 1987).
152
432 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2005).
153
Fasano, 457 F.3d at 290.
154
Id.
155
No. 4:08CV1057 HEA, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3427 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 20, 2009)
156
Id. at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
157
Id. at *4.
158
Fasano, 457 F.3d at 279.
159
Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 785 F.3d 483 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1655
(2016); Fasano, 457 F.3d 274, cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 977 (2007); Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432
F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 822 (2006); Ana. Leon T. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of
Chi., 823 F.2d 928 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 945 (1987).
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“at pleasure” may only pursue federal law claims against a bank governed by the Bank Acts.160 Conversely, the Ninth Circuit holds that a
state anti-discrimination statute must “substantively mirror” federal
anti-discrimination law to avoid dismissal.161 And the Third Circuit
falls somewhere in between, requiring that the state regulation “exactly
match” federal law.162
The “starting presumption” is that Congress did not intend for federal law to preempt state law.163 Instead, any “[c]onsideration of issues
arising under the Supremacy Clause ‘start[s] with the assumption that
the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by
. . . [the] Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.”164 And of course, no provision of the Bank Acts expressly
preempts state law. Moreover, courts consistently hold that federal law
does not “preempt the field” of state employment law.165 Consequently,
courts must rely on conflict preemption to resolve the preemption question posed by an application of the Bank Acts.
Preemption is “fundamentally a question of congressional intent”
that requires statutory interpretation.166 As commentators have noted,
the National Bank Act, which the subsequent Bank Acts’ “at-pleasure”
language is modeled from, was passed “to create a market for loans of
the general government” and to facilitate the “issu[ance] and circulation
of a currency based upon the credit of the government.”167 But why Congress included the “at-pleasure” provision in the National Bank Act remains a mystery; Congress did not mention the provision in any recorded debates.168
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Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 785 F.3d 483, 491 (11th Cir. 2015); Schweikert v. Bank of Am.,
521 F.3d 285, 288–89 (4th Cir. 2008); Ana Leon T., 823 F.2d at 931.
161
Kroske, 432 F.3d at 987.
162
Fasano, 457 F.3d at 290.
163
N.Y. Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654
(1995).
164
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
165
See, e.g., Nat’l State Bank, Elizabeth, N.J. v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 985 (3d Cir. 1980) (“[R]egulation of banking has been one of dual [federal and state] control since the passage of the National
Bank Act”).
166
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption
case.”).
167
BOONE, supra note 24, at 290.
168
See Goonan v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 916 F. Supp. 2d 470, 492–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(noting that Congress left no record that it discussed the “at-pleasure” provision). The earliest
mention of the provision by courts occurred in 1896, over thirty years after the National Bank Act’s
passage. See generally Westervelt v. Mohrenstecher, 76 F. 118 (1896).
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Considering the National Bank Act’s purpose at face value, that
purpose, or any other purpose alleged by commentators,169 does not expressly indicate an intent to preclude a plaintiff’s ability to pursue state
claims. One early source, written thirty years after the National Bank
Act’s passage, suggests the “at-pleasure” provision was purposed to prevent banks from entering into fixed-term contracts to preserve their
ability to remove qualifying personnel who had lost the public’s trust.170
Assuming the “at-pleasure” provisions’ purpose is to protect public
trust, as many argue,171 permitting the Bank Acts to prohibit state law
sex discrimination claims, especially in the #MeToo era, arguably undermines that purpose. And a bank’s ability to fire untrustworthy personnel is unlikely to be greatly inhibited by most state anti-discrimination regulations, as the bank remains subject to federal antidiscrimination law.
Nonetheless, some courts are rightfully reluctant to tinker with the
“at-pleasure” provisions’ preemptive capabilities. As Evans articulated:
subjecting the federal reserve banks to state employment laws
and regulations which broaden the rights and remedies available under federal law will subject the federal reserve banks, and
possibly their employees, to a myriad of different laws and regulations which vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.172
Not only would doing so violate the plain text of the “at-pleasure”
provisions, but, if the provisions’ purpose to maintain public trust is to
be believed, it would frustrate the alleged intent of Congress “to allow
the [qualifying] banks the ‘greatest latitude possible’ in terminating
employees.”173 Furthermore, accidental frustration of purpose is not the
only reason courts should be reluctant to tinker with the provisions.

169

See Achtenberg, supra note 22, at 176; Geoffrey P. Miller, The Future of the Dual Banking
Sys., 53 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 13 (1987); Edward L. Symons, Jr., The “Business of Banking” in Historical Perspective, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 676, 699 (1983).
170
See Mackey v. Pioneer Nat’l Bank, 867 F.2d 520, 526 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he purpose of the
[‘at-pleasure’ dismissal] provision in the National Bank Act was to give those institutions the
greatest latitude possible to hire and fire their chief operating officers, in order to maintain the
public trust.”). Compare Westervelt, 76 F. at 122 (“High credit is indispensable to the success and
prosperity of a bank. Without it, customers cannot be induced to deposit their moneys. . . . In such
a case it is necessary . . . that the board of directors should have power to remove [ ] an officer, and
to put in his place another, in whom the community has confidence.”) with Statutory Provision for
Removal of Corporate Officer “At Pleasure”, supra note 31, at 520 (criticizing the purpose of the
“at-pleasure” provision articulated in Westervelt as “conjecture”).
171
Westervelt, 76 F. 118 at 122; see also Mackey, 867 F.2d at 526.
172
Evans v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., No. 03-4975, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13265, at *17
(E.D. Pa. July 8, 2004).
173
Id. at *17–18 (citing Mackey, 867 F.2d at 526); see also Talbott v. Silver Bow Cty., 139 U.S.
438, 35 (1891) (noting Congress designed the National Bank Act to create a national banking system with “uniform operation”).
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When interpreting a statute, the “starting point must be the language
employed by Congress, and [the Court] assume[s] that the legislative
purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.”174 By
this canon, “at pleasure,” with no qualifications, speaks for itself. Under
the provisions’ “straightforward statutory command, there is no reason
to resort to legislative history.”175 But even disregarding this canon, one
can only resort to legislative history to little avail since Congress left no
record of the “at-pleasure” provisions’ purpose.176
No court, and few judges,177 dispute that banks governed by the
Bank Acts are subject to Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and other federal antidiscrimination statutes. Preemption only occurs where the federal and
state laws conflict so that it is “impossible . . . to comply with both”178 or
where state law stands as “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives underlying the federal law.”179
Yet the Ninth Circuit takes this a step further, stating in Kroske that
“in the absence of clear congressional intent to the contrary . . . Kroske’s
claim of age discrimination under the Washington Law Against Discrimination is not preempted by [the National Bank Act], as limited by
the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act].”180
Surely the last-in-time rule181 amends the Bank Acts to the “minimum extent necessary” to resolve any conflict with federal anti-discrimination laws.182 However, the “minimum extent necessary” cannot logically include rights and remedies beyond those allowed for by federal
law. Repeal or amendment may only occur if “the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, or [if] the later statute covers the whole ground occupied by the earlier and is clearly intended as a substitute for it.”183 The
“at-pleasure” provisions provide qualifying banks the absolute, unlimited power to dismiss certain employees. Conversely, Title VII and other
federal anti-discrimination laws prohibit such banks from dismissing

174

Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
175
United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997); see also Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503
U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (Congress “says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what
it says there.”).
176
Goonan v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 916 F. Supp. 2d 470, 492–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
177
See Peatros v. Bank of Am., 990 P.2d 539, 183–89 (Cal. 2000) (Brown, J., dissenting).
178
English v. Gen. Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
179
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
180
432 F.3d 976, 987–88 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 822 (2006).
181
See Doe v. Considine, 73 U.S. 458, 468 (1868) (“The rule applicable to the construction of
conflicting statutory provisions is, that the last in order of time . . . must take effect.”).
182
See Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 986 (9th Cir. 2005).
183
Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 504 (1936).
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employees under certain conditions.184 Therefore, any unconditioned
right to dismiss granted by the “at-pleasure” provisions is made illegal.
That is, to the extent that federal anti-discrimination laws irreconcilably conflict with the “at-pleasure” provisions, those laws impliedly
amend the Bank Acts to grant the qualifying banks “a limited power to
dismiss [qualifying personnel] at pleasure.”185
Despite any implied amendments, state causes of action remain
barred even though some federal statutes contain provisions known as
“saving clauses,” which preserve state laws.186 The “double saving
clause” argument holds that the “at-pleasure” provisions do not
preempt federal anti-discrimination laws containing saving provisions,
and in turn, those federal anti-discrimination laws do not preempt state
anti-discrimination laws.187 But the Supreme Court has dismissed such
reasoning.188 Federal laws containing a saving clause do not transform
state laws into federal laws that are saved from preemption.189 Furthermore, because Title VII and many other federal laws contain such nonpreemption provisions, applied to all state laws with which they do not
conflict, and taken to its logical extreme, the double saving clause argument would protect almost all state laws from preemption by the “atpleasure” provisions.190
As the Supreme Court explained, “[o]rdinarily, state causes of action are not pre-empted solely because they impose liability over and
above that authorized by federal law.”191 Yet the “at-pleasure” provisions remain plain, blanket prohibitions on state law to the contrary.192
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See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012) (forbidding certain types of discrimination on the basis of “race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin”); see also, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (2012); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101 et seq. (2012); 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (2012); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (2012); 38 U.S.C.
§ 4311 (2012).
185
Peatros, 990 P.2d at 549–50.
186
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7; California Fed. Savings and Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S.
272, 288 (1964) (Title VII “assert[s] the intention of Congress to preserve existing civil rights laws.”
(quoting 110 CONG. REC. 2788 (1964) (statement of Rep. Meader)).
187
See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 101 n.22 (1983).
188
See id.
189
See id.
190
Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (“Nothing in this title shall be deemed to exempt or relieve
any person from any liability, duty penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law
of any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which purports to require
or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under this title.”).
191
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 89 (1990).
192
The “double saving clause” argument, that the “at-pleasure” provision does not preempt
federal anti-discrimination law, and federal anti-discrimination law does not preempt state antidiscrimination laws, has been described a simplistic. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 101
n.22 (1983). For example, Title VII does not transform state laws into federal laws that are saved
from preemption. See id. Furthermore, because Title VII’s saving clause applies to all state laws
with which it is not in conflict, and since many federal laws contain non-preemption provisions,
the double saving clause argument, taken to its logical extreme would save almost all state laws
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Thus, as observed by the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, the “atpleasure” provisions preempt any state anti-discrimination law that
contradicts them.193 Courts should not “rewrite the statute to reflect a
meaning” they “deem more desirable.”194 Under the retail approach,
courts fail to “give full effect to . . . state laws [by] picking and choosing
which parts of them may apply,”195 and consequently, courts replace any
“absence of legislative intent” with their own.196 In Fasano v. Federal
Reserve Board of New York,197 the Third Circuit demonstrated the problems with such an approach:
For example . . . the [state law] does not require exhaustion of
administrative remedies; a plaintiff elects whether to proceed in
the administrative arena, or in court, but a final decision in either forum is binding and renders the other forum unavailable.
Were we to graft the [Americans with Disabilities Act]’s exhaustion requirement onto the [state law], we would transform formerly final, binding administrative determinations into nonbinding preliminaries to litigation. We will not step on the toes
of the New Jersey legislature in this or any other like manner.198
Not only does Kroske’s reasoning step on the toes of state legislatures, it also disregards Congress’ intent—whatever it was—when enacting the National Bank Act’s “at-pleasure” provision, and its intent
when enacting subsequent Bank Acts that purposely and deliberately
borrowed that same language.199 Instead, by looking to the ordinary
meaning, courts can avoid “rewriting” state laws “to parrot Federal
anti-discrimination law” as occurs under the retail approach.200 Such
reasoning is not only faithful to the plain language, but also to Title VII
and other federal anti-discrimination laws, impliedly repealing the
Bank Acts only to the extent necessary to give effect to those laws, and
no further.
from pre-emption. Id.
193
See Crowe v. Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, No. 4:08CV1057 HEA, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3427, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 20, 2009) (“If preemption only applied to state laws that directly contradict federal laws, federal laws could be effectively nullified by state laws prohibiting those acts
that are incident to, but not specifically authorized, by federal law.”) (internal quotations marks
omitted).
194
Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 228 (2008).
195
457 F.3d 274, 290 (3d Cir. 2006).
196
See Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 987–88 (9th Cir. 2005).
197
See generally Fasano, 457 F.3d 274.
198
Id.
199
See H.R. REP. NO. 63-69 (1913) (stating the purpose of the Federal Reserve Act’s “at-pleasure” provision is the same as that of the National Bank Act).
200
Evans v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., No. 03-4975, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13265, at *21
(E.D. Pa. July 8, 2004).
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Moreover, the total preemption approach allows for the efficient
administration and governance of qualifying banks because anti-discrimination laws are then applied to them uniformly across the country.201 Conferring qualifying personnel different rights and remedies
“would frustrate the ability of the national banks to make crucial employment decisions, ultimately undermining confidence in the national
banking system.”202 While Congress’ original intent for including the
“at-pleasure” provision is unknown and relies on speculation, this efficiency argument furthers the purpose of the National Bank Act, and
subsequent acts, as a whole by giving full effect to the language employed by Congress.
Adopting this approach—that the Bank Acts preempt all state laws
prohibiting the at-will dismissal of qualifying personnel—still demands
congressional action. Although Title VII affords plaintiffs alleging sex
discrimination a meaningful remedy, Congress should narrow the “atpleasure” provisions’ scope. In the era of #MeToo and other anti-discriminatory movements, it would be wise to eliminate barriers to pursuing sex discrimination claims. Congress should proceed cautiously,
however, as undesirable consequences may accompany such duplicative
claims. For example, allowing for state law remedies to discrimination
may “dissuade[] employers from executing lawful and economically necessary terminations” because such terminations might be characterized
as discriminatory “and could subject employers to more time-intensive
and expensive litigation.”203The Third Circuit’s approach, articulated in
Fasano v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York,204 avoids such problems
because entities governed by the Bank Acts, while subject to both state
and federal anti-discrimination law, are subject to only one set of
claims: those arising under federal anti-discrimination law and state
anti-discrimination law to the extent that the state law “exactly
match[es]” the federal law.205 By adopting this approach, Congress
would neither unknowingly disturb any of the alleged purposes of the
Bank Acts’ “at-pleasure” provisions, nor would Congress fail to give
state laws their full effect by allowing courts to pick and choose which
various provisions of state laws to apply.206 This remains faithful to
Congress’ purpose for including the “at-pleasure” provisions in the
Bank Acts, while effectuating the purposes of state anti-discrimination
201

See Peatros v. Bank of Am., 990 P.2d 539, 562 (Cal. 2000) (Brown, J., dissenting).
Id.
203
Katherine R. Morelli, Note, A Misguided Reversal: Why the Okla. Supreme Court Should
Not Have Interpreted Saint v. Data Exchange, Inc. to Provide a Burk Tort Cause of Action to Plaintiffs Alleging Age Discrimination in Employment, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 329, 352 (Winter 2010).
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457 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2006).
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Id. at 290.
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See id.
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laws to the extent that they are consistent with federal law. Such an
approach bolsters anti-discrimination protections by expanding the
number of options207 available to those harmed while protecting Congress’ purpose for including the “at-pleasure” provisions in the Bank
Acts and without butchering the intent of state legislatures.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits adopt the correct reading
and application of the Bank Acts’ “at-pleasure” provisions.208 Their approach is not only true to the plain meaning of the provisions’ words,
but also to Congress’ purpose for including the provisions in the acts—
whatever that purpose may be.209 Moreover, their approach respects
legislative intent by giving full effect to state laws without picking and
choosing which portions of those laws should apply.
But in the #MeToo era, Congress need not settle for this interpretation. Instead, Congress can remain faithful to both federal and state
legislative intent while strengthening anti-discrimination regulations.
To do so, Congress should adopt the Third Circuit’s wholesale preemption approach,210 providing that the Bank Acts do not preempt state
anti-discrimination laws to the extent that the state laws “exactly
match” federal laws.211 Such an approach does not remove the “at-pleasure” provisions from law, leaving them to serve whatever purpose they
may. And in preserving the provisions, it bolsters plaintiffs’ ability to
seek anti-discrimination relief by providing them with matching state
law options to pursue. Consequently, the Third Circuit’s approach increasingly deters qualifying banks from engaging in discrimination
while respecting the “at-pleasure” provisions’ purpose.
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